Pig butchering

Also called: sha zhu pan · 杀猪盘 · crypto romance investment scam · long-con crypto fraud

Pig butchering is a long-term investment scam in which a stranger builds a friendship or romance over weeks or months, then introduces a cryptocurrency or trading platform that shows fake profits. Victims can withdraw small amounts early, then are blocked by invented taxes and fees. Most operations run from Southeast Asian compounds staffed by trafficked workers.

Key facts

Category
Investment
First documented
2016
Typical loss
$20k–$500k USD, per victim
Main channels
WhatsApp, Telegram, dating app, LinkedIn, SMS, Instagram, wrong-number text
Who is targeted
Financially comfortable adults aged 30–60, often mid-career professionals; Recently divorced, widowed, relocated or otherwise socially isolated; People with some investing experience — enough to feel competent, not enough to audit a platform; Diaspora communities approached in their own language
Documented origins
Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, United Arab Emirates
Main targets
United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, Japan, Germany, Netherlands
Case files
7 documented cases
Last reviewed
2026-09-06
Anatomy of a pig butchering scamAnatomy of a pig butchering scam. The stages, in order. The relationship phase does all the work; the money phase is short. 1. Contact that looks accidental: A wrong number, a dating match, a LinkedIn note about your industry. 2. Weeks of friendship, no ask: Move to WhatsApp or Telegram. No links, no pitch, no money. 3. Wealth mentioned in passing: Investing arrives as biography. Reluctance makes you ask to join. 4. A small deposit that performs: A polished platform with charts, support chat and verification. It gains. 5. One withdrawal succeeds: A small payout arrives. Belief becomes personal knowledge. 6. Escalation, with help finding money: Loans, credit lines, family money, retirement accounts, in-platform 'loans'. 7. The withdrawal is blocked: A tax, then a fee, then a deposit — payable only from new outside money. 8. Silence, then a recovery offer: Weeks later, someone offers to get the money back for a fee. The diagram marks stage 5 as the point where the scheme can still be stopped: An early withdrawal that works is evidence of the scheme, not against it. It is the cheapest credibility the operation can buy, and it reliably produces a much larger second deposit. If a platform someone introduced you to has just paid you a small amount, stop before the next one.Anatomy of a pig butchering scamThe stages, in order. The relationship phase does all the work; the money phase is short.1Contact that looksaccidentalA wrong number, a datingmatch, a LinkedIn noteabout your industry.Day 12Weeks of friendship,no askMove to WhatsApp orTelegram. No links, nopitch, no money.1–3 months3Wealth mentioned inpassingInvesting arrives asbiography. Reluctance makesyou ask to join.Week 3–84A small deposit thatperformsA polished platform withcharts, support chat andverification. It gains.Days5One withdrawalsucceedsA small payout arrives.Belief becomes personalknowledge.Days6Escalation, with helpfinding moneyLoans, credit lines, familymoney, retirement accounts,in-platform 'loans'.Weeks7The withdrawal isblockedA tax, then a fee, then adeposit — payable only fromnew outside money.Days8Silence, then arecovery offerWeeks later, someone offersto get the money back for afee.Weeks laterWhere it can still be stopped — stage 5An early withdrawal that works is evidence of the scheme, not against it. It is the cheapest credibility the operation can buy, and it reliably produces a muchlarger second deposit. If a platform someone introduced you to has just paid you a small amount, stop before the next one.Stages documented in DOJ and US Treasury actions, 2025–2026, and the UN OHCHR report on cyber scam operations, 2026.howscamswork.com
The stages of the scheme, in order, with the point where it can still be stopped.

What it is

Pig butchering is an investment scam wrapped in a relationship. Someone you have never met starts a conversation — a wrong number, a friendly reply on a dating app, a LinkedIn message about your industry — and then does something no ordinary scammer does: nothing. For weeks. They ask about your day. They send photos of their lunch. They remember what you told them last Tuesday. By the time money is mentioned, the person raising it is not a stranger; they are the person you talk to most.

The ask, when it comes, is not a request for money. It is an invitation to do what they are already doing: trading crypto, or gold, or foreign exchange, on a platform they have been using successfully. You install an app or open a web dashboard. It has charts, an order book, a support chat, a verification flow. Your first deposit shows a gain within a day. If you try to withdraw a small amount, it arrives in your wallet.

From there the scheme takes everything it can reach. Not just savings — the operators push for loans, remortgages, borrowing from family, retirement accounts. The number on the dashboard keeps rising, which is what makes each additional deposit feel rational. The platform is a rendering. There is no trading, no counterparty, no custody. The FBI recorded $8.6 billion in reported investment-fraud losses in the United States in 2025 alone, of which cryptocurrency investment fraud was the largest single component at $7.2 billion.

How it actually works

  1. Contact that looks like an accident

    A message arrives that appears misdirected — a wrong number confirming a dinner reservation, a “hi, is this Michelle?” — or a warm approach on a dating app, Instagram or LinkedIn. Profiles are attractive, plausible and lightly aspirational: a business owner, a designer, someone who travels. The apology-and-chat that follows a “wrong number” is not a recovery from a mistake. It is the opening move.

  2. Weeks of relationship, with no ask

    Conversation moves quickly to WhatsApp, Telegram or Line. There is no request for money, no link, no pitch. This phase can run one to three months and is the whole reason the scheme works: it converts a stranger into a trusted person before anything is asked of you. Voice notes are common; video calls are refused, deflected, or increasingly faked.

  3. Wealth mentioned in passing, never pushed

    Investing enters as biography, not advice. They mention an uncle in finance, a strategy they learned, a good month. If you ask about it, they are reluctant. The reluctance is the pitch — you end up asking to be included, which makes the decision feel like yours.

  4. A small deposit that performs

    You are walked onto a platform that looks institutional. The first deposit is deliberately modest. It gains. The interface is responsive, the support agent is polite, and there is a real verification process — all of which signal legitimacy to someone who has never had to audit an exchange.

  5. One successful withdrawal

    You take a small amount out and it arrives. This is the pivot point of the entire scheme. Nothing else buys credibility as cheaply, and nothing else reliably produces a much larger second deposit. If you remember one thing about this page, make it this: an early withdrawal that works is evidence of the scam, not against it.

  6. Escalation, with help

    Deposits grow. The scammer invests alongside you, or appears to. When you hesitate, they suggest ways to find more — a loan, a credit line, family, a retirement account. Some operations offer “loans” inside the platform itself, which manufacture a debt you now feel obliged to trade out of.

  7. The withdrawal is blocked

    You try to take out a serious sum. Now there is a tax. Then a compliance fee, an anti-money-laundering deposit, an account-upgrade requirement. Each one is payable only from new money, never from the balance shown on screen — which should be impossible if the balance existed. This is the stage where a victim’s own money is used as the reason to send more of it.

    Where it could have stopped

    Any fee that must be paid from outside a balance you can see is proof the balance is not real. A genuine platform deducts fees from your funds. Stop here, send nothing more, and report it.

  8. Silence, then a second approach

    The account is frozen or the contact disappears. Weeks later someone gets in touch offering to recover the funds — a “blockchain investigator”, a lawyer, a government-sounding agency. They want a fee. This is the same industry selling to the same list. See recovery scams.

Why it works

The mechanics are ordinary. The psychology is not, and it is worth naming precisely, because “they were greedy” and “they were naive” are both wrong and both stop people asking for help.

Time is the weapon. Almost every fraud defence people carry — be suspicious of strangers, don’t click links, if it sounds too good to be true — is calibrated for a fast attack. This scheme spends one to three months making sure that when the pitch arrives, it does not come from a stranger. You cannot be suspicious of a stranger who is no longer one.

The ask is engineered to feel like your idea. Investing is introduced as something the scammer already does and is mildly reluctant to discuss. Reactance does the rest: the more they hold back, the more the target pushes to be let in. People defend decisions they believe they made.

The early withdrawal converts belief into knowledge. Before it, you trust a person. After it, you have personally tested the system and it worked. That shift is extremely hard to reverse, which is why the operators spend real money on it.

Sunk cost, then debt. Each deposit makes withdrawal feel closer and abandonment more expensive. By the time borrowed money is in, stopping means admitting a loss that cannot be quietly absorbed. The scheme’s most reliable engine is the victim’s own reluctance to have wasted everything so far.

Isolation is deliberate. Targets are told the opportunity is private, that family will not understand, that mentioning it risks the allocation. Australia’s National Anti-Scam Centre found older Australians reported the highest total losses of any age group, and secrecy is a recurring feature of the highest-loss reports.

Shame keeps it going and keeps it hidden. People who realise what has happened often do not report, which is exactly why the FBI’s most effective single intervention has been telling victims they are being scammed before they work it out themselves — almost 9,000 people contacted, an estimated $562 million saved.

Where it comes from

This is one of the few scam types with a well-documented physical geography, and the documentation is official rather than inferred.

The operations run substantially from compounds in the Mekong region. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in its 2026 report “A Wicked Problem”, put the workforce at at least 300,000 people originating from 66 countries, and found that 74% of all scam compounds are still located in the Mekong sub-region. Individual compounds can hold thousands to tens of thousands of workers; some exceed 500 acres and function as self-contained towns behind fortified walls.

The US Treasury has named specific sites. Its September 2025 designations covered nine targets in Burma and ten in Cambodia, naming Shwe Kokko in Karen State, Burma, and Sihanoukville, Bavet and Pursat Province in Cambodia. In October 2025 the US and UK jointly designated Cambodia’s Prince Group as a transnational criminal organisation, alongside a Justice Department forfeiture action covering approximately 127,271 bitcoin — about $15 billion, the largest in the department’s history.

The workforce is largely not there by choice. Treasury describes recruitment under false pretences followed by debt bondage, violence and the threat of forced prostitution; escapees have reported being held for ransom, beaten for missing quotas, and forced into commercial sex work. The UN report documents torture, sexual violence and food deprivation. In February 2025 some 7,000 people were released from operations along the Thailand–Myanmar border in a little over two weeks.

Two qualifications matter. First, this is about criminal enterprises and the territories where they have found protection — not about the nationalities of the people in the compounds, who come from dozens of countries and are frequently the victims of a separate crime. Second, the geography moves. The UN report records operations spreading to Pacific Island countries, South Asia, the Gulf States, West Africa and the Americas. Enforcement in one place relocates the industry rather than ending it.

Real cases

The 276-arrest scam-centre takedown and the San Diego charges

2026 US · AE · TH Charged — allegation, not conviction

On 29 April 2026 the US Justice Department announced a coordinated international takedown of cryptocurrency scam centres that produced at least 276 arrests across several countries. Alleged managers and recruiters were charged in the Southern District of California; three defendants were apprehended in Dubai and one in Thailand. The FBI said its related victim-notification effort, Operation Level Up, had contacted almost 9,000 victims and saved them an estimated $562 million.

Read the case file · 1 source

The FTC ranks "wrong number" texts among the five biggest text scams

2025 US Ongoing $470.0m

In April 2025 the FTC published its analysis of 2024 text-message fraud reports and placed the "wrong number" opener fifth among the top five text scams — the only one of the five with no pretext at all. The same analysis records $470 million lost to text-initiated fraud in 2024, more than five times the 2020 figure, and a doubling in the share of text scam reports that involved actual money lost.

Read the case file · 4 sources

Fictitious law firms: the recovery scam that borrows the FBI's name

2025 US Ongoing $9.9m

The FBI has issued three escalating public warnings about a scheme that targets people who have already lost money to cryptocurrency fraud. Operators posing as lawyers at firms that do not exist contact victims, claim to be working with the FBI or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and charge fees to recover funds they never recover. Between February 2023 and February 2024 alone, victims further exploited this way reported losses of over $9.9 million.

Read the case file · 3 sources

Job scams: five times the losses in Canada, double the reports in Australia

2025 CA · AU Ongoing $33.2m

Canadian job-scam losses rose from C$9.5 million in 2021 to C$48.9 million in 2024 — more than five times — while report counts fell. In Australia, Scamwatch job-scam reports rose 102.4% in 2025 and losses jumped 81.5%, from A$13.7 million to A$24.8 million, with the largest increases among people aged 25 to 34 and among First Nations, disabled and culturally diverse reporters.

Read the case file · 2 sources

Prince Group: the $15 billion forfeiture and the Cambodian compounds

2025 KH · US · GB Charged — allegation, not conviction

In October 2025 US prosecutors in Brooklyn unsealed an indictment charging Chen Zhi, founder and chairman of the Cambodian conglomerate Prince Holding Group, with running forced-labour scam compounds whose trafficked workers ran cryptocurrency investment fraud against victims worldwide. The government moved to forfeit roughly 127,271 bitcoin — about $15 billion, the largest forfeiture action in the history of the Justice Department. The US Treasury designated Prince Group as a transnational criminal organisation the same day, coordinated with sanctions from the United Kingdom.

Read the case file · 2 sources

679,981 Tether: a forfeiture that starts on LinkedIn and a dating app

2025 US Assets seized $679,981

On 3 June 2025 the US Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Ohio filed a civil forfeiture complaint against 679,981.22 in Tether cryptocurrency suspected of coming from a romance and investment scam. Court documents record that one victim was approached through LinkedIn and another through the dating app Coffee Meets Bagel — two different platforms, the same scheme.

Read the case file · 1 source

Treasury sanctions nineteen targets across Burma and Cambodia

2025 MM · KH · US Sanctioned $10.0bn

On 8 September 2025 the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated nineteen targets — nine in Burma and ten in Cambodia — over their role in scam compounds targeting Americans. The action named the compounds and the people behind them, and carried the US government estimate that Americans lost at least $10 billion to Southeast Asia-based scam operations in 2024, a 66% increase on the year before.

Read the case file · 2 sources

Red flags

  • The conversation began with a message that was not meant for you. A wrong-number text that turns into a friendship is a scripted opening, not a coincidence.
  • Weeks of warmth, then investing comes up. Ordinary friends do not follow that arc; this scheme always does.
  • They will not video call, or the call is short and strange. Refusals get creative — a broken camera, a bad connection, a shy personality. Deepfaked calls now exist, so a call that happens is not proof either.
  • The platform came from them. Any app, link, QR code or “install this” that reached you through the relationship. Real brokers are found by you, on your own regulator’s register.
  • An early withdrawal worked. Treat this as the strongest single indicator that you are inside the scheme, not outside it.
  • You are asked to pay a tax or fee before withdrawing. No legitimate platform requires new external money to release your own balance.
  • Deposits go to a wallet address or a personal bank account rather than a named, regulated institution — and the address changes between deposits.
  • You are encouraged to borrow. Loans, credit lines, remortgaging, family money, retirement accounts. No legitimate investment relationship pushes this.
  • You have been asked to keep it to yourself. “Don’t tell your bank what it’s for” is not discretion. It is the scheme protecting itself from the one person who might stop it.
  • Someone contacts you afterwards offering to recover the money. That is the second scam, and it works on the same list.

If it’s happening to you

If you have not sent money yet. Stop replying. You do not owe an explanation and you will not win an argument — the person on the other end is working from a script, often under duress. Do not tell them you have worked it out; simply stop. Screenshot the conversation, the platform and the wallet addresses before you block anything, then report it.

If money has already gone. Move today; the first hours matter more than anything else you will do.

  1. Call your bank’s fraud line. A transfer that has not settled can sometimes be recalled, and your bank can freeze further payments. Say the words “I have been scammed” — banks have a process that starts with them.
  2. If it went to crypto, contact the receiving exchange immediately. Send them the transaction hashes. Exchanges can and occasionally do freeze deposits, but only if they hear quickly.
  3. Report it to your national agency. This is what generates the intelligence behind takedowns like the ones on this page. See where to report in your country.
  4. Preserve everything. Screenshots, phone numbers, profile URLs, wallet addresses, transaction hashes, the platform’s domain, the app installer if you still have it. Do not delete the app before you have it recorded.
  5. Tell one person you trust. Isolation is a load-bearing part of this scheme, and it does not end when the money does.
  6. Expect the recovery approach and refuse it. Nobody legitimate charges an up-front fee to recover stolen crypto. If a “recovery” contact reaches you, that is new evidence for your existing report, not a solution.

What not to do. Do not send one more payment to release the balance — there is no balance. Do not pay for recovery. And do not carry this on your own: people who lose money to this scheme lose it because it was engineered by an industry, not because they were foolish.

Where the money goes

Deposits leave on a rail that cannot be reversed — cryptocurrency, a bank transfer to a mule account, occasionally a cash courier. From there the funds are consolidated, split across wallets, swapped between tokens and chains, and moved through over-the-counter brokers who exchange them for local currency outside any exchange that would ask questions. The UN’s report describes the standard path: mule bank accounts, conversion to virtual currency, movement through crypto wallets, laundering by over-the-counter brokers, then reintroduction into formal banking. That the Prince Group forfeiture found roughly 127,271 bitcoin sitting in unhosted wallets shows how much of it never returns to a regulated institution at all.

The other half of this story

Our sibling site Clean on Paper explains what happens next — how stolen crypto is laundered through chain-hopping, mixers and OTC brokers, and why the point where it re-enters the banking system is where it is most likely to be caught.

By the numbers

No agency publishes a line item for most of the schemes on this site, so these charts show the official categories that contain this scheme. Each series is labelled with the agency's own category name. See how the mapping works.

How contact was made, CA, 2025Horizontal bars of reported losses by contact channel in 2025, led by Internet-social network at $94m.How contact was made, CA, 2025Reported losses by the channel the scammer used, for the agency categories covering this scheme.Internet-social network$94mInternet-social network: $94mInternet$74mInternet: $74mOther/unknown$24mOther/unknown: $24mDirect call$17mDirect call: $17mText message$13mText message: $13mEmail$5.8mEmail: $5.8mDoor to door/in person$2.9mDoor to door/in person: $2.9mPrint$1.2mPrint: $1.2mTelevision$993,652Television: $993,652Not Available$615,090Not Available: $615,090$0$25m$50m$75mAggregated across every agency category that maps to this scheme, so it inherits those categories’ breadth.Reported losses only. Every agency here says most fraud is never reported to it, so treat these as a floor, not a total.Sources: Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP. Pulled 2026-09-06.
Full dataset, methodology and downloads
Reported losses over timeLine chart of reported losses from 2021 to 2025 for the agency categories that cover this scheme: Investment (US); Investment Related (US); Confidence/Romance (US); Investment (AU).Reported losses over timeEach line is one agency category that covers this scheme. Agency categories are usually broader than the scheme itself.$0$2.0bn$4.0bn$6.0bn$8.0bnInvestment (US), 2023: $4.6bnInvestment (US), 2024: $6.6bnInvestment (US), 2025: $8.6bnInvestment Related (US), 2024: $5.7bnConfidence/Romance (US), 2023: $653mConfidence/Romance (US), 2024: $672mConfidence/Romance (US), 2025: $929mInvestment (AU), 2024: $623mInvestment (AU), 2025: $540m20212022202320242025Investment (US)Investment Related (US)Confidence/Romance (US)Investment (AU)Categories are the publishers’ own and are broader than this scheme, so these lines bound it rather than measure it exactly. Lines are notcomparable to each other: different countries, different reporting systems.Reported losses only. Every agency here says most fraud is never reported to it, so treat these as a floor, not a total.Sources: Federal Trade Commission (US); Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP; FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3); National Anti-ScamCentre (ACCC), Australia (transcribed from the published report); UK Finance (transcribed from the published report). Pulled 2026-09-06.
Full dataset, methodology and downloads

Sources

Every factual claim above traces to one of these. Statistics are reported losses; see methodology for what that does and does not measure.

  1. Chairman of Prince Group Indicted for Operating Cambodian Forced Labor Scam Compounds Engaged in Cryptocurrency Fraud Schemes. US Department of Justice. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: Prince Group indictment, $15bn forfeiture, forced-labour compounds in Cambodia.
  2. Coordinated Takedown of Scam Centers Leads to at Least 276 Arrests. US Department of Justice. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: 276 arrests, San Diego charges, Operation Level Up victim notification figures.
  3. Treasury Sanctions Southeast Asian Networks Targeting Americans with Cyber Scams. US Department of the Treasury. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: $10bn US losses in 2024 and 66% increase; Shwe Kokko and Sihanoukville; coercion methods.
  4. "A Wicked Problem": Seeking Human Rights-Based Solutions to Trafficking into Cyber Scam Operations in South-East Asia. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: 300,000 people from 66 countries; 74% of compounds in the Mekong region; compound conditions; industry revenue estimates.
  5. 2025 Internet Crime Report. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: Investment fraud losses; $7.2bn cryptocurrency investment fraud; Southeast Asian organised crime and forced labour.
  6. Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2024. US Federal Trade Commission. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: Investment-related median loss and payment method distribution.

Common questions

How long does a pig butchering scam usually take?

Weeks to months. The relationship phase is deliberately unhurried — there is no ask at all until the target would describe the scammer as a friend. Urgency appears only at the end, when the victim tries to withdraw.

Can I get my money back after a pig butchering scam?

Sometimes, if you move immediately. Crypto sent to an exchange can occasionally be frozen if that exchange is notified fast. Report to your national agency and your bank the same day. Be aware that anyone who contacts you afterwards offering to recover funds for a fee is almost certainly running a second scam.

Why is it called pig butchering?

It translates the Chinese term sha zhu pan, 杀猪盘. The metaphor is the operators' own: the victim is 'fattened' with attention and small winnings before the slaughter. It is their vocabulary, not a description anyone chose on the victims' behalf.

Is the person messaging me the one taking my money?

Usually not. UN investigators estimate at least 300,000 people from 66 countries have been drawn into these operations, many trafficked and held against their will. The person on the other end is often working to a quota under threat, using a script.

The platform let me withdraw money once. Doesn't that prove it is real?

No — it is a designed step. Allowing an early withdrawal is the cheapest way to buy credibility, and it reliably produces a much larger second deposit. A platform that pays out small amounts and then invents a tax or fee to block a large one is following the standard pattern.

How do I check whether a trading platform is real?

Look it up on your own national regulator's register — searching for the firm's name yourself, never using a link, phone number or 'verification page' the platform gave you. Regulators in most countries also publish warning lists of unauthorised firms.

Where the money goesWhere the money goes. Each hop is harder to reverse than the last. The reversible window is the first one. Where the money goesEach hop is harder to reverse than the last. The reversible window is the first one.Victim's bank accountBank transfer, thenbought as cryptoRetail crypto exchangeWithdrawn to addressesthe operation controlsUnhosted wallets,split and swappedChain-hopped, mixed,consolidatedOTC broker,off-exchangeExchanged for localcurrencyShell companies andbank accountsReversibilityA recall is realistically possible only at the first hop, and only in the first hours. After the money is converted it becomes an investigation, not a refund.How this gets laundered — Clean on Paper, our sibling site on money launderinghttps://cleanonpaper.site/techniques/chain-hopping/Path described in the UN OHCHR 2026 report and in the DOJ forfeiture action against Prince Group, October 2025.howscamswork.com
Where the money goes after it leaves, and where it becomes hard to recover.

Report it

Reporting is what produces the enforcement data on this page. Find the right agency and phone number for your country on the report page. If money moved in the last few hours, call your bank first.