Romance scams

Also called: confidence fraud · romance fraud · dating scam · sweetheart swindle · romance baiting

A romance scam is a relationship created to extract money. The operator builds trust over weeks or months using stolen photographs and a story that explains why they cannot meet, then introduces a crisis needing a small, urgent, repayable loan. Requests escalate, and payments usually go to a domestic account belonging to someone else.

Key facts

Category
Romance & relationship
First documented
2001
Typical loss
$5k–$250k USD, per victim
Main channels
dating app, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, WhatsApp, Telegram, online games, wrong-number text
Who is targeted
Adults over 50, and disproportionately those recently widowed, divorced or bereaved; People living alone, or isolated by illness, caring responsibilities or a recent move; Men and women in roughly similar numbers, contrary to the stereotype; Financially comfortable people — the scheme needs a target who has something to give; Increasingly, people approached on professional networks rather than dating apps
Documented origins
Nigeria, Ghana, Myanmar, Cambodia, Malaysia, United States, South Africa
Main targets
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Germany, Netherlands, Singapore
Case files
12 documented cases
Last reviewed
2026-09-06
Anatomy of a romance scamAnatomy of a romance scam. The relationship is the product. The first ask is small, late, and framed as a crisis. 1. A profile built to fit: Photographs taken from someone else. A life story that explains distance and absence. 2. Move off the platform fast: WhatsApp or Telegram within days, before the app's fraud team sees anything. 3. Intensity, then dependence: Constant contact, future plans, declarations early. The relationship becomes the main one. 4. Isolation, framed as intimacy: Family who 'won't understand'. A private thing, between the two of you. 5. The first ask is a crisis: A medical bill, customs, a frozen account, a flight home. Small, urgent, repayable. 6. Payment to someone else's account: A friend's account, a business, a courier. Rarely to the person you think you know. 7. Escalation, or a pivot to investing: More crises, or an introduction to a trading platform that changes the scale entirely. 8. Recruitment, sometimes: The victim is asked to receive and forward money — becoming a mule, with criminal exposure. The diagram marks stage 5 as the point where the scheme can still be stopped: The first request is never for a lot and never for them. It is an emergency, it is temporary, and it will be paid back. That framing is the tell: a genuine partner in trouble has a bank, a family, an employer and an embassy. You are being asked because you are the only route that does not verify anything.Anatomy of a romance scamThe relationship is the product. The first ask is small, late, and framed as a crisis.1A profile built tofitPhotographs taken fromsomeone else. A life storythat explains distance andabsence.Before contact2Move off the platformfastWhatsApp or Telegram withindays, before the app'sfraud team sees anything.Days3Intensity, thendependenceConstant contact, futureplans, declarations early.The relationship becomesthe main one.Weeks to months4Isolation, framed asintimacyFamily who 'won'tunderstand'. A privatething, between the two ofyou.Ongoing5The first ask is acrisisA medical bill, customs, afrozen account, a flighthome. Small, urgent,repayable.Month 2-66Payment to someoneelse's accountA friend's account, abusiness, a courier. Rarelyto the person you think youknow.Days7Escalation, or apivot to investingMore crises, or anintroduction to a tradingplatform that changes thescale entirely.Months8Recruitment,sometimesThe victim is asked toreceive and forward money —becoming a mule, withcriminal exposure.LaterWhere it can still be stopped — stage 5The first request is never for a lot and never for them. It is an emergency, it is temporary, and it will be paid back. That framing is the tell: a genuinepartner in trouble has a bank, a family, an employer and an embassy. You are being asked because you are the only route that does not verify anything.Stages documented in US Department of Justice romance-fraud prosecutions unsealed in 2025 and 2026, and in FBI IC3 reporting.howscamswork.com
The stages of the scheme, in order, with the point where it can still be stopped.

What it is

A romance scam is a relationship that exists in order to be spent.

That sentence does a lot of work, because it explains what otherwise looks irrational. The operator is not impatient. They are not trying to get money in week one. They are building the only asset that matters — a person who trusts them more than they trust their own bank — and until that asset exists, asking for anything would destroy it.

The mechanics are unglamorous. Photographs belong to someone else, usually a real person whose social media has been scraped. The biography explains, in advance, why meeting is impossible: an offshore contract, a military deployment, a hospital, a business abroad. Contact moves off the dating app within days, onto WhatsApp or Telegram, where nobody is monitoring anything. Then weeks or months of constant attention — the sort of attention that people who are lonely, bereaved or newly single have often not had for a long time.

The first request is always small, always urgent, and always temporary. A customs charge. A medical bill. A flight home. It is framed as a loan, and it is often repaid, because repaying two hundred dollars to unlock twenty thousand is a good trade.

The reported numbers are large and almost certainly a fraction of the truth: $929 million in the United States in 2025 across 23,159 complaints, A$139.9 million in Australia, £39.2 million in UK bank-recorded losses, up 23% in a year.

How it actually works

  1. A profile built to fit a gap

    Photographs lifted from a real person. A profession that is respectable, mobile and hard to check — engineer on a rig, surgeon with an aid organisation, soldier deployed, businessman abroad. The story’s job is to explain absence before you have thought to ask about it.

  2. Off the platform within days

    Dating apps and social networks have fraud teams and reporting buttons. WhatsApp and Telegram do not. Moving the conversation is presented as intimacy — “I’d rather talk properly” — and it is the last point at which a platform could have intervened.

  3. Intensity, at a pace nobody sustains honestly

    Constant messaging. Good-morning texts. Declarations within weeks. Plans for a shared future. It is not that the operator is a gifted romantic; it is that they are doing this as a job, at volume, with a script, and they have time you do not.

  4. Isolation, dressed as intimacy

    Your family will not understand. Your friends will be jealous. This is private, between the two of you. The effect is to remove the one thing most likely to stop the scam: another person hearing about it.

  5. The first ask is a crisis, not a request

    Never large, never for them exactly, always temporary. Detained at customs. A hospital deposit. A contract fee to release wages. Often repaid, which converts a suspicion into a settled question.

    Where it could have stopped

    A real partner in trouble has a bank, an employer, a family, an insurer and an embassy. You are being asked because you are the only route that does not verify anything. The reason for the payment does not matter; the fact that you are the mechanism does.

  6. The money goes to somebody else

    An assistant, a business partner, a shipping agent, a friend’s account. Almost never to the person you believe you are helping. This is the mule layer, and it is what makes the transfer feel safe: it is domestic, in an ordinary name, to an ordinary bank.

  7. Escalation, or a pivot

    Either the crises continue and grow — because each payment proves you will pay — or the conversation turns to an investment platform, at which point the losses change scale entirely. That version is pig butchering.

  8. Sometimes, recruitment

    Victims are asked to receive money and forward it, or to open an account “for the business”. At that point the victim becomes a money mule, with criminal exposure of their own. Several defendants in the cases below are charged with precisely this role.

Why it works

Start by discarding the explanation most people reach for. Romance fraud does not work because victims are foolish or desperate. It works because it is a professional operation applying months of undivided attention to one person, using a script refined across thousands of attempts.

Attention is the currency, and it is genuinely scarce. Someone recently widowed, or living alone, or caring for a partner with dementia, may be receiving more warmth from this person than from anyone else in their life. That is not a character flaw being exploited. It is a real absence being filled.

The story is built to survive scrutiny. Every implausibility is pre-answered. Why no video? The rig has no bandwidth. Why no meeting? The deployment. The excuses are not improvised.

Reciprocity precedes the ask. By the time money is mentioned, the operator has given months of time, sympathy and interest. Refusing feels like a betrayal of something real, because the feelings are real. Only one side of them is.

Repaying the first loan buys everything. Two hundred dollars returned promptly converts “is this person real?” into a settled question, and the next request is met with much less resistance. It is the same move as the early withdrawal in an investment scam.

Sunk cost hardens into shame. After enough payments, stopping means admitting to yourself and possibly to your family what has happened. Continuing preserves the story. This is why victims often keep paying after they have begun to suspect, and why the largest losses come late.

And isolation is engineered, not incidental. The single most effective intervention is another person hearing the details, which is exactly what the operator spends months making less likely.

Where it comes from

The prosecution record is specific about two clusters, and this section describes criminal enterprises and their structure, not nationalities.

West African networks, particularly Ghanaian and Nigerian, dominate the American and European case record. The Justice Department’s 2025 elder-fraud enforcement summary names case after case following the same shape: relationships run against elderly Americans, proceeds shared with co-conspirators in Ghana, and a domestic layer in the United States receiving and moving money. Two indictments in the Northern District of Ohio alone charged eleven people over conduct spanning December 2017 to March 2024.

Southeast Asian compounds account for the version that pivots to investment. Where romance is the route in and a trading platform is the destination, the operation is usually a pig butchering compound — an industry the UN estimates involves at least 300,000 workers, many of them trafficked.

The structural point matters more than the map. The person you are talking to, the person whose bank account receives the money and the person who ultimately keeps it are frequently three different people in three different countries. That is why “they seemed so real” and “the account was a local one” are both compatible with the whole thing being a fraud, and why prosecutions so often reach the middle layer rather than the top.

Real cases

Laundering $3.1m of scam proceeds through salvaged cars shipped to West Africa

2026 US · NG Sentenced $3.1m

In August 2026 a Nigerian national living in Houston was sentenced to 95 months in prison for leading a conspiracy that laundered more than $3.1 million in proceeds from business email compromise, romance and unemployment insurance fraud. The method was mundane and effective: buy used and salvaged cars with the stolen money, ship them to West Africa, and sell them there. One traced victim was a Puerto Rican renewable energy company tricked into wiring about $280,000.

Read the case file · 1 source

A romance scam victim who then became the mule

2026 US · NG Convicted

Samuel D. Marcus, 33, of Oreland, Pennsylvania, lost money to a romance scam in late 2022 and early 2023 — then, prosecutors say, knowingly kept working with the same Nigeria-based fraud ring as a money mule while employed as a logistics specialist with the Defense Logistics Agency. He was indicted in February 2026 and pleaded guilty to one count of concealment money laundering, facing sentencing in October 2026.

Read the case file · 2 sources

The 276-arrest scam-centre takedown and the San Diego charges

2026 US · AE · TH Charged — allegation, not conviction

On 29 April 2026 the US Justice Department announced a coordinated international takedown of cryptocurrency scam centres that produced at least 276 arrests across several countries. Alleged managers and recruiters were charged in the Southern District of California; three defendants were apprehended in Dubai and one in Thailand. The FBI said its related victim-notification effort, Operation Level Up, had contacted almost 9,000 victims and saved them an estimated $562 million.

Read the case file · 1 source

"Dada Joe Remix": a decade of romance and inheritance fraud, and an extradition request

2025 GH · US Charged — allegation, not conviction

A grand jury indictment unsealed in Arizona in May 2025 charged Joseph Kwadwo Badu Boateng, a Ghanaian citizen known as "Dada Joe Remix", with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Prosecutors allege that from at least 2013 through March 2023 he and co-conspirators ran a romance and inheritance scheme against elderly American victims and others worldwide, telling them gold and jewels were waiting to be released once taxes and fees were paid. Ghanaian authorities arrested him on 28 May 2025 at the request of the United States.

Read the case file · 1 source

$893 million in AI-involved fraud, and where it actually shows up

2025 US Ongoing $893.3m

The FBI received more than 22,000 complaints reporting AI-related information in 2025, with adjusted losses of $893,346,472. Its breakdown is more useful than the headline: over $30 million in AI-linked business email compromise, over $19 million in romance and confidence scams with a likely AI nexus, over $5 million in voice-cloned distress scams, and almost $13 million in employment scams where voice spoofing was used in interviews.

Read the case file · 2 sources

The Ohio–Ghana romance conspiracies: eleven defendants, seven years

2025 US · GH Charged — allegation, not conviction

Between May and June 2025 the US Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Ohio unsealed charges against eleven people over wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies that ran from December 2017 through March 2024. Prosecutors say the defendants used romance fraud schemes, frequently against elderly Americans, and shared the proceeds with co-conspirators in Ghana.

Read the case file · 1 source

Prince Group: the $15 billion forfeiture and the Cambodian compounds

2025 KH · US · GB Charged — allegation, not conviction

In October 2025 US prosecutors in Brooklyn unsealed an indictment charging Chen Zhi, founder and chairman of the Cambodian conglomerate Prince Holding Group, with running forced-labour scam compounds whose trafficked workers ran cryptocurrency investment fraud against victims worldwide. The government moved to forfeit roughly 127,271 bitcoin — about $15 billion, the largest forfeiture action in the history of the Justice Department. The US Treasury designated Prince Group as a transnational criminal organisation the same day, coordinated with sanctions from the United Kingdom.

Read the case file · 2 sources

679,981 Tether: a forfeiture that starts on LinkedIn and a dating app

2025 US Assets seized $679,981

On 3 June 2025 the US Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Ohio filed a civil forfeiture complaint against 679,981.22 in Tether cryptocurrency suspected of coming from a romance and investment scam. Court documents record that one victim was approached through LinkedIn and another through the dating app Coffee Meets Bagel — two different platforms, the same scheme.

Read the case file · 1 source

£576 million and 248,070 cases: the UK's authorised push payment problem

2025 GB Ongoing $759.4m

UK Finance recorded £1.28 billion in total payment fraud losses in 2025, of which £576.4 million was authorised push payment fraud — money victims sent themselves after being deceived — across 248,070 cases. Impersonation fraud, the category containing the safe-account scam, was one of the few to fall, with losses down 12% and cases down 11%, while investment fraud rose 40%.

Read the case file · 2 sources

Extradited from Malaysia: romance victims used as unwitting money mules

2025 KE · MY · US Charged — allegation, not conviction

On 22 May 2025 Malaysia extradited Kenyan national John Muriuku Wamuigah to stand trial in the District of Connecticut on a wire fraud charge. Prosecutors allege he and others executed a scheme using both business email compromise and romance scams, and that the scheme involved exploiting elderly victims through romance fraud so that they would serve as unwitting money mules.

Read the case file · 1 source

The FBI's catalogue of how generative AI gets used in fraud

2024 US Ongoing

In December 2024 the FBI published an itemised account of how criminals use generative AI across text, images, audio and video. The most consequential entries are the mundane ones: AI used to correct grammar and spelling for foreign actors targeting US victims, to produce fictitious social media profiles at volume, and to generate the content of fraudulent investment websites.

Read the case file · 1 source

50 fraudulent accounts, $9.5 million, and a 25-year sentence

2022 US Sentenced $9.5m

Elvis Eghosa Ogiekpolor, 46, of Norcross, Georgia, was sentenced in October 2022 to 25 years in federal prison for opening and directing others to open at least 50 fraudulent business bank accounts that received more than $9.5 million from romance scams and business email compromise fraud. Thirteen romance fraud victims testified at his trial; one described sending nearly $70,000 to a man she met on eHarmony. He moved the money on through dozens of accounts, including several overseas, before it reached the people who took it from victims in the first place.

Read the case file · 2 sources

Red flags

  • They want to move off the app almost immediately. Within days, before anyone could report the profile.
  • They will not video call, or the calls are brief and odd. Treat a call that does happen as weak evidence: deepfaked video exists.
  • The job explains the absence. Offshore rig, deployment, surgeon abroad, contract in another country. Convenient in exactly the way it needs to be.
  • Declarations of love arrive fast, well before anyone has met.
  • Plans are always about to happen. A flight is booked, then something goes wrong with it.
  • You are discouraged from telling people. Any version of “they won’t understand” is the scheme protecting itself.
  • The first money request is small, urgent and repayable. That is the shape, not a coincidence.
  • Payment goes to a third party — an assistant, a business, a friend’s account, a shipping agent.
  • You are asked to receive money and forward it. Stop immediately. This is a criminal role, not a favour.
  • An investment opportunity appears after weeks of relationship. That is the point at which losses stop being thousands and start being everything.
  • Reverse image search finds their photographs attached to a different name.

If it’s happening to you

If you are still deciding. You do not have to reach a verdict on whether this person is real. Send no money, receive no money, share no codes, and tell one person you trust the entire story including the parts that feel embarrassing. Nothing in that list damages a genuine relationship, and all of it stops a fraud.

If money has gone.

  1. Call your bank’s fraud line today. A recent domestic transfer is the one scenario with a real chance of recall.
  2. Stop all contact, but preserve everything first. Screenshot the profile, the photographs, the messages, the account details and the payment confirmations before you block anything.
  3. Report it. See where to report. Reporting is what produced the prosecutions on this page.
  4. Do not confront them. It achieves nothing, and it can trigger the next phase — threats, blackmail if intimate images were shared, or a “recovery” approach.
  5. If you received and forwarded money for them, say so when you report. You may have been used as a money mule. It is far better to raise that yourself than to have it found.
  6. Expect a recovery approach and refuse it. See recovery scams.

If it is someone you know. Do not lead with “you are being scammed” — that produces defensiveness and, often, secrecy. Ask about the person. Ask whether they have video called. Offer to help check the photographs. The goal is to get a second pair of eyes onto the details, because that is what the scheme is built to prevent. And do not make it about foolishness: this is a professional operation that took months, and treating the victim as gullible is what stops people asking for help.

Where the money goes

Money almost never goes straight overseas. It goes first to a domestic account in an ordinary name — the “assistant”, the “business partner”, the friend. That first hop is the whole reason the transfer feels safe: it is local, to a real person, at a real bank.

From there it converts fast, usually within days, into cryptocurrency, gift cards or cash, and is shared with co-conspirators abroad. The Justice Department’s Ohio cases describe proceeds shared with co-conspirators in Ghana; a separate Houston conspiracy laundered romance proceeds alongside business email compromise takings by buying salvaged cars and shipping them to Nigeria.

The domestic layer is also where prosecutions start, because it is the only part of the chain standing inside the jurisdiction that was robbed.

The other half of this story

Our sibling site Clean on Paper explains how mule networks are structured — how the accounts are recruited, why they are layered, and how banks detect them.

By the numbers

No agency publishes a line item for most of the schemes on this site, so these charts show the official categories that contain this scheme. Each series is labelled with the agency's own category name. See how the mapping works.

How contact was made, CA, 2025Horizontal bars of reported losses by contact channel in 2025, led by Internet-social network at $28m.How contact was made, CA, 2025Reported losses by the channel the scammer used, for the agency categories covering this scheme.Internet-social network$28mInternet-social network: $28mInternet$4.9mInternet: $4.9mText message$2.9mText message: $2.9mOther/unknown$2.2mOther/unknown: $2.2mEmail$571,633Email: $571,633Door to door/in person$537,584Door to door/in person: $537,584Direct call$67,239Direct call: $67,239Video Call$34,248Video Call: $34,248Not Available$31,201Not Available: $31,201Mail$2,861Mail: $2,861$0$10m$20mAggregated across every agency category that maps to this scheme, so it inherits those categories’ breadth.Reported losses only. Every agency here says most fraud is never reported to it, so treat these as a floor, not a total.Sources: Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP. Pulled 2026-09-06.
Full dataset, methodology and downloads
Reported losses over timeLine chart of reported losses from 2021 to 2025 for the agency categories that cover this scheme: Imposter Scams (US); Confidence/Romance (US); Romance (AU); Romance (CA).Reported losses over timeEach line is one agency category that covers this scheme. Agency categories are usually broader than the scheme itself.$0$1.0bn$2.0bn$3.0bnImposter Scams (US), 2024: $3.0bnConfidence/Romance (US), 2023: $653mConfidence/Romance (US), 2024: $672mConfidence/Romance (US), 2025: $929mRomance (AU), 2024: $103mRomance (AU), 2025: $90mRomance (CA), 2021: $52mRomance (CA), 2022: $46mRomance (CA), 2023: $39mRomance (CA), 2024: $43mRomance (CA), 2025: $39m20212022202320242025Imposter Scams (US)Confidence/Romance (US)Romance (AU)Romance (CA)Categories are the publishers’ own and are broader than this scheme, so these lines bound it rather than measure it exactly. Lines are notcomparable to each other: different countries, different reporting systems.Reported losses only. Every agency here says most fraud is never reported to it, so treat these as a floor, not a total.Sources: Federal Trade Commission (US); Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP; FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3); National Anti-ScamCentre (ACCC), Australia (transcribed from the published report); UK Finance (transcribed from the published report). Pulled 2026-09-06.
Full dataset, methodology and downloads

Sources

Every factual claim above traces to one of these. Statistics are reported losses; see methodology for what that does and does not measure.

  1. Justice Department Highlights Enforcement Efforts Protecting Older Americans from Transnational Fraud Schemes in Recognition of 2025 World Elder Abuse Awareness Day. US Department of Justice. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: The Boateng, Amponsah, Ogedegbe, Nwadavid, Wamuigah and Tether forfeiture cases, and the DOJ definition of romance fraud.
  2. 2025 Internet Crime Report. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: US confidence/romance losses of $929,287,469 from 23,159 complaints in 2025, and the three-year trend.
  3. Targeting scams: report of the National Anti-Scam Centre on scams data and activity 2025. National Anti-Scam Centre (ACCC), Australia. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: A$139.9m Australian romance losses in 2025, down 10.8%; romance as the second-highest loss scam type for people aged 55-64.
  4. Fraud remains a national security threat as criminals steal almost £1.3 billion. UK Finance. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: UK romance fraud losses of £39.2m in 2025, up 23% with cases up 22%.
  5. Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Fraud Reporting System Dataset. Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: Canadian romance category reports, victims and losses by year and age band.
  6. Nigerian National Sentenced for Laundering $3.1M in Scam Proceeds. US Department of Justice. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: Romance proceeds laundered alongside business email compromise and unemployment fraud by a single conspiracy.

Common questions

Why won't they video call?

Because the photographs belong to someone else. The excuses are consistent — a broken camera, bad connectivity offshore, a military posting, shyness. Be aware that a call happening is no longer proof either: deepfaked video has been used in documented frauds, so a callback on a number you already had is stronger evidence than any call they arrange.

Are romance scam victims mostly lonely older women?

No. Reported victims include men and women in broadly similar numbers, and while losses concentrate among older people, the age range is wide. Australia's data shows people aged 55-64 and 65-plus reporting the largest romance losses, but the highest-loss individual reports include people in their thirties and forties.

They asked me to receive money and send it on. Is that a problem?

Yes, a serious one. That makes you a money mule, and it is a criminal offence in most jurisdictions whether or not you understood what you were doing. Several defendants in the prosecutions on this page are charged with exactly that role. Stop, keep the messages, and report it.

Can I get my money back?

Sometimes, and only if you move immediately. Call your bank the same day; a domestic transfer that has not been moved on can occasionally be recalled. Civil forfeiture recovers a small fraction of traced funds. What does not work is paying anyone who contacts you offering to recover it.

How do I check whether someone is real?

Reverse image search their photographs — the results often name the real owner. Ask something specific about a place they claim to be, and notice whether the answer is generic. But the strongest signal is not identity at all: it is the money. A real relationship does not need you to send funds to a third party's account.

I still think this person might be genuine. What now?

You do not have to resolve that to be safe. Send no money, share no codes, receive no payments on anyone's behalf, and tell one person you trust the whole story. If the relationship is genuine, none of that damages it. If it is not, all of it stops the loss.

Where romance-scam money goesWhere romance-scam money goes. Almost never straight abroad. The first hop is domestic, which is what makes it feel safe. Where romance-scam money goesAlmost never straight abroad. The first hop is domestic, which is what makes it feel safe.Victim's own accountDomestic transfer, sonothing looks foreignA domestic account ina real nameConverted within daysCrypto, gift cards orcashShared withco-conspiratorsoverseasCo-conspirators abroadReversibilityA recall is realistically possible only at the first hop, and only in the first hours. After the money is converted it becomes an investigation, not a refund.How mule networks are structured — Clean on Paper, our sibling sitehttps://cleanonpaper.site/techniques/money-mules/Path documented in US Department of Justice romance-fraud and money-laundering prosecutions, 2025 to 2026.howscamswork.com
Where the money goes after it leaves, and where it becomes hard to recover.

Report it

Reporting is what produces the enforcement data on this page. Find the right agency and phone number for your country on the report page. If money moved in the last few hours, call your bank first.