Sextortion

Also called: financially motivated sextortion · webcam blackmail · image-based blackmail

Sextortion is a demand for money under threat of publishing intimate images or messages. In a large share of cases the sender has nothing and is bluffing at scale, quoting a leaked password to sound credible. Paying does not end it. The FBI received more than 75,000 sextortion reports in 2025.

Key facts

Category
Extortion
First documented
2010
Typical loss
$200–$5k USD, per victim
Main channels
Instagram, Snapchat, email, online games, dating app, Discord, SMS
Who is targeted
Young adults aged 20 to 29, who file more reports than any other group by a wide margin; Teenage boys, targeted heavily in the financially motivated variant; People aged 60 and over, who file far fewer reports but lose more than twice as much; Anyone whose email appears in a historic data breach — the mass-email version needs nothing else
Documented origins
Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Philippines, Morocco, Russia
Main targets
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Germany, Netherlands
Case files
3 documented cases
Last reviewed
2026-09-06
Anatomy of a sextortion demandAnatomy of a sextortion demand. Two different crimes share the name: a bluff sent at volume, and a targeted manipulation. 1. Contact, or an email out of nowhere: A friendly approach on a social platform, or a mass email quoting an old breached password. 2. Something to hold over you: Images exchanged, an account broken into, or — most often — nothing at all. 3. The threat, with a deadline: Pay within hours or it goes to your contacts. A list of your followers is often attached. 4. Escalation if you engage: Replying, negotiating or paying all confirm a live target and increase the demands. 5. Or silence if you do not: Most senders have nothing and move on. Volume, not follow-through, is the business model. 6. Report, and get takedown help: Platforms, NCMEC and national services can act — often before anything is published. The diagram marks stage 3 as the point where the scheme can still be stopped: Paying does not end it. Every reported loss in this category is somebody who paid and was asked again. Stop responding, preserve everything, and tell one person — the demand loses its power the moment somebody else knows.Anatomy of a sextortion demandTwo different crimes share the name: a bluff sent at volume, and a targeted manipulation.1Contact, or an emailout of nowhereA friendly approach on asocial platform, or a massemail quoting an oldbreached password.Day 12Something to holdover youImages exchanged, anaccount broken into, or —most often — nothing atall.Hours to days3The threat, with adeadlinePay within hours or it goesto your contacts. A list ofyour followers is oftenattached.Hours4Escalation if youengageReplying, negotiating orpaying all confirm a livetarget and increase thedemands.Days5Or silence if you donotMost senders have nothingand move on. Volume, notfollow-through, is thebusiness model.Days6Report, and gettakedown helpPlatforms, NCMEC andnational services can act —often before anything ispublished.Same dayWhere it can still be stopped — stage 3Paying does not end it. Every reported loss in this category is somebody who paid and was asked again. Stop responding, preserve everything, and tell oneperson — the demand loses its power the moment somebody else knows.Stages documented in FBI IC3 annual reporting for 2025 and the IC3 advisory of August 2026 on stolen explicit content.howscamswork.com
The stages of the scheme, in order, with the point where it can still be stopped.

What it is

Sextortion is a demand for money backed by the threat of publishing intimate images or messages. Two quite different crimes share the name, and telling them apart matters because the response differs.

The bluff, sent at volume. An email arrives quoting a password you once used, claiming that your webcam was accessed and that a recording exists. There is a payment address and a deadline. In the overwhelming majority of these, nothing exists. The password came from a historic data breach, the email went to hundreds of thousands of people, and the economics work if a tiny fraction pay.

The targeted version. Someone establishes contact, often on Instagram, Snapchat or a game, sometimes over weeks. Images are exchanged. The demand follows immediately, usually with a screenshot of the victim’s follower list attached. This form is aimed heavily at teenage boys and young men, and it moves very fast — sometimes from first message to demand within a single evening.

A third form is growing: content stolen rather than given. The FBI warned in August 2026 that sexual exploitation actors are breaking into social media accounts to take explicit content and sell it, frequently before the victim knows anything has happened.

The volume is enormous and the average loss is small. IC3 received more than 75,000 sextortion submissions in 2025, and the wider extortion category ran to 89,129 complaints with an average reported loss of about $1,374 — against $20,699 across all IC3 complaints.

If this is happening to you right now

Stop replying. Do not pay. Screenshot everything, including the account and any payment address. Then tell one person — a friend, a parent, anyone. This is a crime committed against you and it is extraordinarily common. If you are under 18, or the images are of someone under 18, contact law enforcement immediately: that is not a scam, it is child exploitation, and it is treated as such.

How it actually works

  1. Contact, or an email from nowhere

    Either a friendly approach on a social platform or game, or a mass email quoting a password from an old breach. The two versions look nothing alike and are both sextortion.

  2. Something to hold over you — or nothing at all

    Images exchanged during a conversation, content stolen from a broken-into account, or, most often in the email version, no material whatsoever.

  3. The threat, with a deadline

    Pay within hours or it goes to your contacts. A list of your followers or family members is often attached to show that the audience has been identified.

    Where it could have stopped

    Paying does not end it. Every reported loss in this category is somebody who paid and was contacted again. The demand’s power comes from being a secret, and it collapses the moment one other person knows.

  4. Escalation if you engage

    Replying, negotiating or paying all confirm a live target. Demands increase, and deadlines shorten. The people who lose the most are the ones who tried to manage it alone.

  5. Or silence, if you do not

    Most senders have nothing and move on. Volume rather than follow-through is the business model, and the falling loss figures alongside rising complaint counts suggest more people are now recognising that.

  6. Reporting, and takedown

    Platforms remove non-consensual intimate imagery. Fingerprinting services can block an image from being uploaded without anyone having to see or store it. Both work better before publication than after.

Why it works

Shame is the mechanism. Not fear of the images so much as fear of the conversation that follows them. The scheme’s entire power is the victim’s certainty that nobody can be told, and every part of the message is built to reinforce that.

The deadline prevents the pause. Hours, not days. The window is deliberately shorter than the time it takes to calm down enough to think, or to work out who to ask.

A quoted password feels like proof. It is the only piece of real information in a mass email, and it does an enormous amount of work — most people do not know how widely breached credentials circulate.

Young people are targeted where secrecy is easiest. The financially motivated variant aimed at teenagers works because a fourteen-year-old cannot imagine telling a parent. That is the design, not a side effect.

And older victims are inside something longer. The 60-plus group files a quarter of the reports of the 20-29 group and loses more than twice as much, because their version usually arrives inside a relationship rather than as a cold demand.

Where it comes from

Financially motivated sextortion aimed at English-speaking teenagers has been documented running substantially from West Africa, particularly Nigerian and Ivorian networks, operating at high volume through scripted approaches on Instagram and Snapchat. Law enforcement in several countries has described organised groups sharing scripts and target lists.

The mass-email bluff has no single geography. It requires nothing but a breached credential dump and a cryptocurrency address, and it is sent from anywhere.

The account-intrusion variant described in the FBI’s 2026 advisory is a different business again — closer to organised credential theft, with stolen content sold into criminal marketplaces rather than used to extort the person it came from.

What all three share is that the operator is rarely where the victim is, and rarely reachable. That is why the practical response on this page is about limiting harm and getting support, not about identifying anyone.

Real cases

Stolen, not given: accounts broken into for explicit content

2026 US Ongoing

In August 2026 the FBI warned that sexual exploitation actors are illegally accessing victims' social media and personal accounts to steal explicit content and sell it on criminal marketplaces — often without the victim ever knowing. The intrusion methods are ordinary account-takeover techniques, including one that turns on persuading the victim to hand over a verification code.

Read the case file · 1 source

Extortion complaints nearly doubled while losses did not

2025 US Ongoing $122.5m

FBI extortion complaints rose from 48,223 in 2023 to 89,129 in 2025 — an 85% increase — while reported losses went from $74.8 million to $122.5 million and then fell back in the most recent year. The pattern is consistent with a very high-volume, low-value crime: enormous numbers of approaches, most of which extract nothing.

Read the case file · 1 source

75,000 sextortion reports, and where the money actually is

2025 US Ongoing $44.2m

The FBI received more than 75,000 sextortion submissions in 2025 and referred over 5,700 involving minors to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children. Its age breakdown shows the pattern most coverage misses: people in their twenties file by far the most reports, while people aged 60 and over lose more than twice as much money as any other group.

Read the case file · 1 source

Red flags

  • An email quoting an old password of yours. Change it everywhere you used it; that is the only action required.
  • A demand with a deadline of hours, payable in cryptocurrency or gift cards.
  • A screenshot of your follower or contact list attached to the threat.
  • A new contact who moves to intimate conversation very fast, and steers toward images early.
  • A profile with few posts, few followers and photographs that look professionally shot.
  • Pressure to move to a different app where messages disappear.
  • A text saying your social media account will be disabled unless you reply with a code. That is an account takeover in progress.
  • A password reset you did not request.
  • A second demand after you have paid. There is always one.
  • Someone offering to make it go away for a fee after the fact. That is a recovery scam.

If it’s happening to you

Right now, in order.

  1. Stop replying. Not out of defiance — engagement is what identifies you as worth pursuing.
  2. Do not pay. If you already have, stop. You have not made it unfixable.
  3. Screenshot everything: the profile, the messages, the payment address, the account name and URL. Do this before blocking anyone.
  4. Block, then report the account to the platform. Platforms act on this and act quickly.
  5. Tell one person. This is the step that ends the crime, because the threat only works while it is a secret. Choose whoever is easiest, not whoever seems most appropriate.
  6. Report it to your national agency. See where to report.

If you are under 18, or the images are of someone under 18. Contact law enforcement immediately. This is child exploitation and is treated as a serious crime with dedicated units. You are not in trouble. In the United States, NCMEC’s Take It Down service can prevent images of minors being posted or reposted, working from a digital fingerprint so that nobody has to see or store the image itself.

If you are an adult with images at risk. StopNCII works the same way for adults, creating a hash that participating platforms use to block uploads. Both services are free, and neither requires you to send anyone the image.

If you are a parent. The most useful thing you can do is in advance, and it is one sentence: if anything like this ever happens, you can tell me and you will not be in trouble. Teenagers do not conceal this because they do not trust their parents; they conceal it because they believe the consequence of telling is worse than the threat. Removing that belief is the whole intervention.

What not to do. Do not pay. Do not negotiate. Do not delete the evidence before recording it. Do not try to identify the person yourself. And do not pay anyone who later offers to remove the images for a fee.

Where the money goes

Payments are almost always demanded in cryptocurrency or gift cards, and the sums are small enough to sit below any threshold that would attract a bank’s attention. In the mass-email version, a single address may receive payments from many victims, which is occasionally how clusters get traced.

The economics are worth understanding, because they explain why the crime persists at this volume. A mass sextortion email costs essentially nothing to send. If one recipient in ten thousand pays a few hundred dollars, it is profitable. Nothing about it requires skill, infrastructure, or any material relating to the recipient — which is why quoting an old breached password is such an efficient substitute for actually having something.

The other half of this story

Our sibling site Clean on Paper explains how extortion payments are moved — and why many small cryptocurrency payments into one address are among the easier patterns for investigators to cluster.

By the numbers

No agency publishes a line item for most of the schemes on this site, so these charts show the official categories that contain this scheme. Each series is labelled with the agency's own category name. See how the mapping works.

How contact was made, CA, 2025Horizontal bars of reported losses by contact channel in 2025, led by Direct call at $8.9m.How contact was made, CA, 2025Reported losses by the channel the scammer used, for the agency categories covering this scheme.Direct call$8.9mDirect call: $8.9mEmail$439,685Email: $439,685Other/unknown$296,137Other/unknown: $296,137Text message$244,967Text message: $244,967Internet-social network$227,024Internet-social network: $227,024Internet$191,304Internet: $191,304Not Available$93,484Not Available: $93,484Video Call$61,884Video Call: $61,884Door to door/in person$33,405Door to door/in person: $33,405Mail$12,008Mail: $12,008$0$2.5m$5.0m$7.5mAggregated across every agency category that maps to this scheme, so it inherits those categories’ breadth.Reported losses only. Every agency here says most fraud is never reported to it, so treat these as a floor, not a total.Sources: Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP. Pulled 2026-09-06.
Full dataset, methodology and downloads
Reported losses over timeLine chart of reported losses from 2021 to 2025 for the agency categories that cover this scheme: Extortion (US); Extortion (CA).Reported losses over timeEach line is one agency category that covers this scheme. Agency categories are usually broader than the scheme itself.$0$50m$100m$150mExtortion (US), 2023: $75mExtortion (US), 2024: $143mExtortion (US), 2025: $122mExtortion (CA), 2021: $15mExtortion (CA), 2022: $15mExtortion (CA), 2023: $9.8mExtortion (CA), 2024: $15mExtortion (CA), 2025: $10m20212022202320242025Extortion (US)Extortion (CA)Categories are the publishers’ own and are broader than this scheme, so these lines bound it rather than measure it exactly. Lines are notcomparable to each other: different countries, different reporting systems.Reported losses only. Every agency here says most fraud is never reported to it, so treat these as a floor, not a total.Sources: Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP; FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). Pulled 2026-09-06.
Full dataset, methodology and downloads

Sources

Every factual claim above traces to one of these. Statistics are reported losses; see methodology for what that does and does not measure.

  1. 2025 Internet Crime Report. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: More than 75,000 sextortion submissions in 2025; over 5,700 minor referrals to NCMEC; the full age and loss table; Extortion category complaint and loss totals 2023 to 2025.
  2. Sexual Exploitation Actors Stealing and Leaking Explicit Content. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: The account-intrusion variant, the three access methods including the verification-code request, and the re-victimisation warning.
  3. Financially Motivated Sextortion. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: The FBI's guidance for victims and its description of financially motivated sextortion of minors.
  4. Take It Down. National Center for Missing & Exploited Children. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: The hash-based takedown service for images of people under 18.
  5. StopNCII.org. Revenge Porn Helpline / SWGfL. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: The hash-based takedown service for adults.
  6. Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Fraud Reporting System Dataset. Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre / RCMP. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: Canadian extortion category reports, victims and losses, 2021 to 30 September 2025.
  7. Targeting scams: report of the National Anti-Scam Centre on scams data and activity 2025. National Anti-Scam Centre (ACCC), Australia. Accessed 2026-09-06. Supports: Threat-based scams as the highest-loss category for Australians aged 18 to 24, attributed partly to sextortion volume.

Common questions

They quoted one of my passwords. Do they have access to my accounts?

Almost always no. Old passwords circulate in bulk from historic data breaches, and quoting one is the standard way to make a mass email feel personal. Change that password everywhere you have used it and turn on two-factor authentication — but the password appearing in an email is not evidence that anyone has anything of yours.

Should I pay to make it stop?

No. Paying identifies you as someone who pays and reliably produces further demands. Every reported loss in this category is somebody who paid and was contacted again. If you have paid, stop — you have not made things worse by having paid once, and continuing is what causes the real harm.

What if they really do have images?

It changes what help you need, not the answer about paying. Stop responding, keep everything, and get takedown support: platforms act quickly on non-consensual intimate images, and there are services that can prevent publication rather than only respond to it. If the person in the images is under 18, contact law enforcement immediately — this is child exploitation, not a scam.

I am a teenager and this is happening to me. What do I do?

Tell an adult you trust today, even though it feels impossible. You are not in trouble and you have not done anything that makes this your fault. Stop replying, do not pay, screenshot everything, and report it. This happens to very large numbers of people your age — more than 5,700 reports involving minors were referred to NCMEC in one year in the US alone — and there are people whose job is exactly this.

Can I get images taken down before they are shared?

Often, yes. Services exist that create a digital fingerprint of an image so platforms can block it without anyone having to see or store the image itself — NCMEC's Take It Down for people under 18, and StopNCII for adults. Platforms also remove non-consensual intimate imagery on request.

Why do older victims lose so much more?

Because they are usually experiencing a different crime. Younger victims typically face a fast, high-volume demand for a few hundred dollars. Older victims are more often inside a longer manipulation, sometimes attached to a relationship built over weeks, where demands are larger and repeated.

Where extortion payments goWhere extortion payments go. The economics are the explanation: sending costs nothing, so one payment in ten thousand is profitable. Where extortion payments goThe economics are the explanation: sending costs nothing, so one payment in ten thousand is profitable.Many recipientsSums small enough tosit below any bankthresholdCryptocurrency or giftcardsA single address mayreceive from manyvictimsOne address, manypayersClustering many smallpayers is how someoperations get tracedExchanges and resaleReversibilityA recall is realistically possible only at the first hop, and only in the first hours. After the money is converted it becomes an investigation, not a refund.How extortion payments are moved — Clean on Paper, our sibling sitehttps://cleanonpaper.site/techniques/chain-hopping/Payment pattern and its tracing value as described in FBI and IC3 reporting on sextortion.howscamswork.com
Where the money goes after it leaves, and where it becomes hard to recover.

Report it

Reporting is what produces the enforcement data on this page. Find the right agency and phone number for your country on the report page. If money moved in the last few hours, call your bank first.