1031 exchange fraud

Also called: qualified intermediary fraud · like-kind exchange fraud · 1031 accommodator fraud · exchange facilitator fraud · section 1031 exchange scam

1031 exchange fraud happens when a qualified intermediary, the company a property seller is legally required to hand sale proceeds to during a tax-deferred exchange, spends or loses that money instead of holding it untouched for up to 180 days. Federal cases have run from $13.7 million to $126 million, because almost no state licenses, bonds or audits these companies.

Key facts

Category
Business & payments
First documented
1999
Typical loss
$13700k–$126000k USD, per victim
Main channels
referrals from real estate agents, closing attorneys and accountants, an intermediary's existing local reputation or multi-state branch network, no public license or registry in most states for a client to check before wiring money
Who is targeted
Sellers of investment or commercial real estate who want to defer capital gains tax under Section 1031 and are legally required to hand their sale proceeds to a third party rather than touch the money themselves; People taking a referral to a qualified intermediary from their real estate agent, closing attorney or accountant, rather than independently checking the company's financial condition; Clients of an intermediary run by people who use their own separate professional credentials, a CPA or an attorney, to make the company look reliable; Clients spread across an intermediary's branch offices in several states, who have no way to see what the branch handling their own exchange is doing with the pooled trust account at headquarters
Documented origins
United States
Main targets
United States
Case files
4 documented cases
Last reviewed
2026-11-04
Anatomy of a 1031 exchange fraudAnatomy of a 1031 exchange fraud. The company legally required to hold your sale proceeds is barely required to prove it still has them. 1. The deadline that forces trust: A seller cannot keep the sale proceeds themselves and still defer the tax; the money must go to a qualified intermediary for up to 180 days. 2. A company almost nobody has to vet: Qualified intermediaries are not licensed, bonded or audited in almost any state. A seller typically takes a referral on faith. 3. The sale closes and the money leaves the seller's control: Proceeds are wired directly to the intermediary's account. The seller has no further say over where the money sits. 4. Trust money becomes the owner's money: Documented cases moved trust funds into the owner's other businesses, real estate ventures or personal spending, while telling clients it remained safely held. 5. New clients' deposits cover the shortfall: An intermediary that has already spent earlier clients' money needs fresh deposits to meet obligations as they come due. 6. Reassurance when anyone asks: Worried clients and staff were told, falsely, that all funds remained safely deposited, at the exact moment that was not true. 7. The deadline arrives and the money is gone: A seller who reaches day 180 finds the intermediary cannot fund the replacement purchase, often losing the tax deferral too. 8. Collapse, bankruptcy and restitution years later: The company folds, often into bankruptcy. Criminal restitution and forfeiture orders, when they come, arrive years after the deadline the client needed the money for. The diagram marks stage 2 as the point where the scheme can still be stopped: A small number of states require bonding, insurance or a segregated escrow account for qualified intermediaries. Most states require none of this, and every documented case here could have been caught, or made impossible, by a bonding and segregation rule the seller's own state did not have.Anatomy of a 1031 exchange fraudThe company legally required to hold your sale proceeds is barely required to prove it still has them.1The deadline thatforces trustA seller cannot keep thesale proceeds themselvesand still defer the tax;the money must go to aqualified intermediary forup to 180 days.Day 02A company almostnobody has to vetQualified intermediariesare not licensed, bonded oraudited in almost anystate. A seller typicallytakes a referral on faith.Before closing3The sale closes andthe money leaves theseller's controlProceeds are wired directlyto the intermediary'saccount. The seller has nofurther say over where themoney sits.Closing day4Trust money becomesthe owner's moneyDocumented cases movedtrust funds into theowner's other businesses,real estate ventures orpersonal spending, whiletelling clients it remainedsafely held.Weeks to months5New clients' depositscover the shortfallAn intermediary that hasalready spent earlierclients' money needs freshdeposits to meetobligations as they comedue.Months to years6Reassurance whenanyone asksWorried clients and staffwere told, falsely, thatall funds remained safelydeposited, at the exactmoment that was not true.Ongoing7The deadline arrivesand the money is goneA seller who reaches day180 finds the intermediarycannot fund the replacementpurchase, often losing thetax deferral too.Day 1808Collapse, bankruptcyand restitution yearslaterThe company folds, ofteninto bankruptcy. Criminalrestitution and forfeitureorders, when they come,arrive years after thedeadline the client neededthe money for.YearsWhere it can still be stopped: stage 2A small number of states require bonding, insurance or a segregated escrow account for qualified intermediaries. Most states require none of this, and everydocumented case here could have been caught, or made impossible, by a bonding and segregation rule the seller's own state did not have.Stages drawn from four federal cases: Edward Okun's 1031 Tax Group (Virginia, sentenced 2009), Donald McGhan's Southwest Exchange (Nevada, sentenced 2009), Summit Accommodators (Oregon, convicted and sentenced 2012 to 2013), and Ezri Namvar's Namco Financial Exchange (California, sentenced 2011), plus a 2008 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration audit of IRS oversight of qualified intermediaries. All four cases are resolved criminal convictions or guilty pleas.howscamswork.com
The stages of the scheme, in order, with the point where it can still be stopped.

What it is

Section 1031 of the tax code lets someone who sells investment or business real estate defer the capital gains tax, as long as they reinvest the proceeds in similar property within strict deadlines, usually 45 days to identify a replacement and 180 days to close on it. To qualify, the seller is not allowed to touch the sale proceeds at all. The money has to pass through a qualified intermediary, a company whose entire job is to hold it, untouched, until the replacement purchase closes.

1031 exchange fraud is what happens when that company does not hold the money. Almost no US state licenses, bonds, audits or otherwise supervises qualified intermediaries, so a seller who wires six or seven figures into one is relying entirely on the company’s own word. The documented federal cases on this page run from $13.7 million lost by 91 clients of a single Oregon firm to $126 million misappropriated by a Virginia operator who bought his way into six companies’ worth of client trust funds.

How it actually works

  1. The deadline that forces trust

    A seller who wants to defer the tax cannot keep the sale proceeds in their own account even briefly. The law requires the money to go to a qualified intermediary, which then has up to 180 days to release it for a replacement property purchase.

  2. A company almost nobody has to vet

    A federal tax watchdog found that qualified intermediaries are not licensed, bonded, audited or held to any federal conduct standard. A seller typically takes a referral from a real estate agent, closing attorney or accountant and wires money to a company they have never otherwise dealt with.

    Where it could have stopped

    A small number of states require a qualified intermediary to carry a fidelity bond, hold funds in a segregated qualified escrow or trust account at an independent institution, or register with a regulator. Most states require none of this. Every case documented on this page could have been caught earlier, or made impossible, by a bonding and segregation requirement the seller’s own state did not have.

  3. The sale closes and the money leaves the seller’s control

    Proceeds are wired directly to the intermediary’s account, not the seller’s. From this moment, the seller has no further say over where the money sits or what it is used for; the exchange agreement, not a bank account the seller can check, is the only thing standing between the money and the intermediary’s own discretion.

  4. Trust money becomes the owner’s money

    In the cases on this page, trust funds were moved into entities the intermediary’s own owners controlled, used to buy unrelated businesses, or spent directly on personal expenses, while clients were told, falsely, that their money remained safely held.

  5. New clients’ deposits cover the shortfall

    An intermediary that has already spent earlier clients’ money has only one way to keep functioning: keep taking in new clients’ deposits and use part of that incoming money to meet earlier obligations as they come due, a structure that only works for as long as new money keeps arriving faster than deadlines do.

  6. Reassurance when anyone asks

    When clients or branch staff raise concerns, the response documented in more than one case on this page was a direct false statement: that all client funds remained safely deposited or held in secure short-term instruments, at the exact moment that was not true.

  7. The deadline arrives and the money is gone

    A seller who reaches day 180 and tries to close on a replacement property discovers the intermediary cannot fund it. By this point the exchange deadline itself has often already passed, so the seller can lose both the money and the tax deferral in the same event.

  8. Collapse, bankruptcy and restitution years later

    The company folds, often into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, as a falling real estate market or a regulator’s questions make the shortfall impossible to keep covering. Criminal restitution and forfeiture orders, when they come, typically arrive years after the deadline the client actually needed the money for.

Why it works

The law itself creates the exposure. A seller who wants the tax deferral has no legal alternative to handing the money to a third party; there is no way to defer the gain while also keeping the funds in an account only the seller controls.

Almost nobody checks the company’s health. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found the IRS has no authority over qualified intermediaries at all, even though it recorded about $101.3 billion in deferred gains from roughly 429,000 like-kind exchanges in the year it audited the program. No federal agency licenses, audits or insures the companies entrusted with that money.

A referral substitutes for diligence. Clients in every documented case on this page took their choice of intermediary from a real estate agent, closing attorney or accountant’s recommendation, rather than independently checking the company’s financial condition, which in most states there is no public record to check in the first place.

Professional credentials can mask the risk. A certified public accountant and a practicing attorney were among the owners sentenced in this page’s Oregon case. A client who would never wire money to an unknown stranger may see little reason to question a company whose principals hold exactly the credentials that are supposed to signal trustworthiness.

New deposits can disguise an existing shortfall. Once an intermediary has diverted earlier clients’ money, it has a strong incentive to keep recruiting new clients, whose incoming deposits can mask the hole for months or years, exactly as new-client inflows did in more than one documented case here.

Where it comes from

A domestic US scheme, built on a tax provision that exists only in the US code, and prosecuted exclusively through federal criminal fraud and money laundering statutes rather than any specialized financial regulator.

Scale runs from a single-state firm to a multi-state network. Oregon’s Summit Accommodators operated from one headquarters with affiliate offices in seven states; Virginia’s 1031 Tax Group was built by buying six already-existing intermediary companies in different markets to reach a larger pool of client money at once.

The owners are often licensed professionals, not outsiders. A certified public accountant, an in-house attorney, and company founders with long-standing local reputations appear among the defendants on this page, not anonymous operators running from offshore.

Enforcement is criminal, not civil, in every documented case here. Unlike some scams this site covers, every case on this page ended in federal wire fraud, mail fraud or money laundering charges, not a regulatory settlement, because the conduct amounts to the straightforward criminal misappropriation of money the defendant was holding only in trust.

Recovery, when it happens, is slow and partial. Bankruptcy trustees and criminal restitution orders are the only recovery paths documented here, and both typically take years and recover a fraction of what was lost; a bankruptcy trustee’s own civil judgment against one Oregon defendant, for example, sought to claw back only $7.5 million against a documented $44 million in misused funds.

Real cases

Three Summit Accommodators owners convicted and sentenced after misusing $44 million in Oregon clients' exchange funds

2013 US Sentenced $13.7m

Mark Neuman, a certified public accountant, and his partners Timothy Larkin and Lane Lyons ran Summit Accommodators, Inc. of Bend, Oregon, a qualified intermediary for Section 1031 real estate exchanges with affiliate offices across seven states. A federal jury in Portland convicted the three on July 5, 2013 of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering, after prosecutors showed they routed client trust money through an entity they controlled into more than 100 real estate projects in which they held personal interests. US District Judge Anna J. Brown sentenced Neuman to 78 months and Larkin and Lyons to 54 months each in mid-December 2013. A fourth owner, Brian Stevens, had pleaded guilty earlier and was sentenced in May 2012 to 48 months after agreeing to testify against the others.

Read the case file · 3 sources

Los Angeles 'qualified intermediary' sentenced to seven years for diverting $21 million in clients' exchange funds to prop up his own company

2011 US Sentenced $20.9m

Ezri Namvar ran Namco Financial Exchange Corp. (NFE), which held itself out as a qualified intermediary for Section 1031 real estate exchanges, in Los Angeles. A federal jury convicted him in May 2011 of four counts of wire fraud after prosecutors showed he and an associate used about $21 million of four clients' exchange proceeds, out of roughly $25 million they had wired to NFE in 2008, to pay the debts and operating expenses of a separate company he controlled, Namco Capital Group, Inc. US District Judge Percy Anderson sentenced Namvar on October 11, 2011 to seven years in federal prison and ordered $20,930,648 in restitution. His co-defendant, Hamid Tabatabai, was sentenced to 21 months.

Read the case file · 1 source

Southwest Exchange owner sentenced to 10 years and $97.4 million restitution for diverting 1031 trust funds into a breast implant company

2009 US Sentenced $97.4m

Donald McGhan, 75, bought the Nevada qualified intermediary company Southwest Exchange, Inc. around June 28, 2004, when it held about $109 million of client exchange money in trust. Within two weeks he moved more than $40 million of that trust money to his own affiliated entities, booked as loans, to help buy Eurosilicone, a French breast implant manufacturer, and continued soliciting new clients even after he knew the company could not meet its obligations. He pleaded guilty on June 8, 2009 to four counts of wire fraud and was sentenced on September 14, 2009 by US District Judge Philip M. Pro to 10 years in federal prison and ordered to pay $97,449,631.49 in restitution to 134 victims.

Read the case file · 2 sources

1031 Tax Group owner sentenced to 100 years after misappropriating about $126 million in client exchange funds

2009 US Sentenced $126.0m

Edward H. Okun bought six existing qualified intermediary companies between August 2005 and April 2007 and rolled them into The 1031 Tax Group LLP (1031TG). A federal jury in Richmond, Virginia convicted him on March 19, 2009 of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, bulk cash smuggling and perjury. U.S. District Judge Robert E. Payne sentenced him on August 4, 2009 to 100 years in federal prison. Prosecutors said he misappropriated about $126 million that clients believed was being held, untouched, for their Section 1031 tax-deferred real estate exchanges.

Read the case file · 3 sources

Red flags

  • Your real estate agent, attorney or accountant names only one qualified intermediary, with no mention of comparing options or checking its financial standing.
  • The intermediary cannot explain, in plain terms, how your specific funds are segregated from its other clients’ money and from its own operating accounts.
  • The company will not confirm whether it carries a fidelity bond or errors-and-omissions insurance, or claims your state does not require one, as most states do not.
  • You are asked to wire a large sum to a company you have never independently verified, based solely on a referral.
  • When you ask where your money currently sits, you get reassurance rather than a specific account statement or confirmation.
  • The company is expanding quickly into new states or buying other exchange companies, which can mean access to a larger trust pool rather than a stronger business.

If it’s happening to you

  1. Contact the intermediary in writing immediately and demand written confirmation of your specific funds’ location and availability. A vague or delayed response is itself a warning sign.
  2. Contact a real estate or tax attorney without delay if your 45-day identification or 180-day closing deadline is approaching and the intermediary cannot confirm your funds are available; there may be narrow IRS relief for exchanges that fail specifically because of a qualified intermediary’s default, but it does not restore the lost money itself.
  3. Check for a bankruptcy filing by the intermediary or its parent company; if one exists, you likely need to file a claim as a creditor promptly rather than wait for the company to resolve things informally.
  4. Report it. File a complaint with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov and with your state’s securities or financial regulator, if it has one. See where to report for other countries.
  5. Gather every document showing the money was supposed to be held in trust: the exchange agreement, wire confirmations, and any written statements the company made about how your funds were segregated. These are exactly what prosecutors relied on in the cases documented here.
  6. If you are choosing an intermediary for a future exchange, ask specifically about bonding, insurance, how long the company has operated, and whether your funds will sit in a qualified escrow or trust account at an independent bank, not merely in the intermediary’s own name.

Where the money goes

In every documented case on this page, the money did not leave the country and did not pass through an elaborate offshore network. It moved from the client’s sale into the intermediary’s own trust account, and from there into real estate ventures, other businesses, or personal spending the intermediary’s owners directly controlled: commercial real estate purchases and a Bahamas yacht in Virginia, a French breast implant manufacturer in Nevada, more than 100 local real estate projects in Oregon, and a separate company’s unpaid debts in California.

What comes back, when anything does, comes back slowly and partially: criminal restitution orders, a bankruptcy trustee’s recoveries, or a civil judgment pursued years after the original deadline. None of the documented cases on this page describe clients being made whole.

The other half of this story

Our sibling site Clean on Paper explains why real estate is one of the easiest places to launder somebody else’s trust money, the same vehicle this scheme’s operators used to turn stolen exchange funds into property they personally controlled.

By the numbers

No published dataset breaks this scheme out as its own category yet, so there is no chart to show. The data page explains which agency categories exist and why some schemes are invisible in official statistics.

Sources

Every factual claim above traces to one of these. Statistics are reported losses; see methodology for what that does and does not measure.

  1. Fourth Circuit Affirms Conviction and Sentence of Edward H. Okun. US Department of Justice, US Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: Edward Okun's purchase of six qualified intermediary companies, the $126 million figure, the 100-year sentence, and the bulk cash smuggling to the Bahamas.
  2. End of the road for a conman. Richmond BizSense. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: Okun's use of client money as his own checking account and for commercial real estate purchases, and his comparison of the scheme to Bernie Madoff's.
  3. Former Chief Operating Officer Pleads Guilty in $132 Million Scheme to Defraud Clients of Funds Allegedly Held in Trust. US Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: Lara Coleman's plea and the characterization of 1031TG's own clients' money as funds 'allegedly held in trust'.
  4. Owner of Qualified Intermediary Company Sentenced to 10 Years for $97 Million Fraud Scheme. US Department of Justice, US Attorney's Office, District of Nevada. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: Donald McGhan's purchase of Southwest Exchange, the diversion of trust funds to buy Eurosilicone, the 10-year sentence and the $97,449,631.49 restitution to 134 victims.
  5. Southwest Exchange Owner Pleads Guilty in Federal Court to Wire Fraud. US Department of Justice, US Attorney's Office, District of Nevada. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: The mechanics of how Southwest Exchange was supposed to hold client funds, and McGhan's continued client solicitation after he knew the company was insolvent.
  6. Jury convicts three in major Bend fraud case. KTVZ (NBC affiliate, Bend, Oregon). Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: Summit Accommodators' structure and seven-state branch network, the Inland Capital Corporation diversion into more than 100 real estate projects, and the false reassurances given to worried clients in February 2007.
  7. Owner of Qualified Intermediary Company Pleads Guilty in Multi-Million Dollar Fraud and Money Laundering Scheme. US Department of Justice, US Attorney's Office, District of Oregon. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: How Summit was supposed to hold client funds in trust, the $44 million misused, and the 91 customers who lost $13.7 million.
  8. Beverly Hills Businessman Ezri Namvar Sentenced to Seven Years in Federal Prison for Defrauding Four Victims of Nearly $21 Million. US Department of Justice, US Attorney's Office, Central District of California. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: Namco Financial Exchange's role as a qualified intermediary, the diversion of client exchange funds into a separate company's debts, and Namvar's seven-year sentence.
  9. Like-Kind Exchange Intermediaries Pose Risks. Accounting Today. Accessed 2026-11-04. Supports: The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration's finding that the IRS has no authority over qualified intermediaries, that they are not licensed, bonded or subject to minimum conduct standards, the IRS's agreement with that finding, and the roughly $101.3 billion in deferred gains from about 429,000 like-kind exchanges TIGTA's audit examined.

Common questions

Is a 1031 exchange itself a scam?

No. Section 1031 of the tax code is a legitimate, long-standing provision letting an owner defer capital gains tax on investment or business real estate by reinvesting the proceeds in similar property within strict deadlines. The fraud on this page is not the tax rule; it is the company the law requires you to hand your money to while you wait out those deadlines.

How is this different from the real estate closing wire fraud this site already covers?

In closing wire fraud, a criminal outside the deal spoofs or hijacks an email to trick you into sending money to an account the criminal controls, impersonating someone you already trust. In 1031 exchange fraud, there is no impersonation: the qualified intermediary is the party you were legally required to trust, and the person who takes the money is the one you knowingly, lawfully wired it to.

Do I have to use whichever qualified intermediary my agent or title company suggests?

No. You can choose your own qualified intermediary, and every case documented on this page involves a company a client, or a client's advisor, selected and trusted without independently checking it. Ask how the company segregates client funds, whether it carries a fidelity bond or errors-and-omissions insurance, and how long it has operated, before wiring a cent.

Does the IRS regulate or guarantee these companies?

No. A 2008 audit by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that the IRS has no authority over qualified intermediaries at all: they are not licensed, bonded or subject to any federal standard for training, competency or conduct, even though the IRS recorded about $101.3 billion in deferred gains from roughly 429,000 like-kind exchanges in the year TIGTA studied. The IRS agreed and said it would add warnings about the risk to its taxpayer guidance; it still has no authority to supervise the companies themselves.

Why would a CPA or an attorney be involved in something like this?

Running or vouching for a qualified intermediary does not require a special license beyond whatever a state happens to impose, which in most states is none. Two of the four defendants in this page's Oregon case were a certified public accountant and the company's own in-house attorney, credentials a client might reasonably treat as reassurance rather than as something to independently verify.

How much money is typically involved?

The documented cases on this page range from $13.7 million realized loss to 91 clients up to roughly $126 million taken from a much larger, multi-state client base, because the exposure scales with however much trust money an intermediary happens to be holding when its owner decides to spend it.

Where the exchange money actually goesWhere the exchange money actually goes. No offshore network required, the trust account itself is the entire target. Where the exchange money actually goesNo offshore network required, the trust account itself is the entire target.A seller's real estatesale proceedsSale proceeds wired tothe intermediary,legally required tohold them untouchedfor up to 180 daysThe qualifiedintermediary's trustaccountDiverted into realestate projects, otherbusinesses andpersonal spending theowner directlycontrolled, documentedfrom $13.7 million to$126 million per caseReal estate deals,other businesses andpersonal spending theowner controlledCourts orderrestitution andforfeiture; bankruptcytrustees recover afraction, years afterthe deadline theclient actually neededthe money forRestitution andbankruptcy recovery,years laterReversibilityA recall is realistically possible only at the first hop, and only in the first hours. After the money is converted it becomes an investigation, not a refund.Why real estate is one of the easiest places to launder somebody else's trust money: Clean on Paper, our sibling sitehttps://cleanonpaper.com/techniques/real-estate/None of the four documented cases on this page describe money moving offshore or through a laundering network; in every case, the intermediary's own trust account was the entire target, and the owner's existing businesses were where the money went next.howscamswork.com
Where the money goes after it leaves, and where it becomes hard to recover.

Report it

Reporting is what produces the enforcement data on this page. Find the right agency and phone number for your country on the report page. If money moved in the last few hours, call your bank first.